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FOREWORD
This "Information Service" has been initiated and established
by the Chief of Naval Personnel for the benefit of officers unable to
attend the Naval War College.
Articles selected for pubUcation are considered to he of value
to all officers. However, their publication should not be considered
as reflecting the opinion of the Naval War College.
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THE ROLE OF THE NAVY IN FUTURE WARFARE
A lecture delivered by

Rear Admiral Charles R. Brown, USN
at the Naval War College
February 15, 1949

The title of my talk today is the role of the Navy in future

warfare. In such a discussion my inclination is to immediately

thrust myself into the future since the history of the past, however

glorious, is of little but academic interest to us unless it has definite

application in the future.

However, I find it impossible to proceed without first ex

plaining my concept of the functions and purposes of a navy and
this, in turn, inevitably leads me into a brie:f review of the past.

So, if you will forgive me, l will broaden my subject to include the

role of the Navy, or more properly expressed, the role of sea power
in the past, present and future. For sea power has never meant

simply navies alone. It has always meant the sum total of all
weapons, installations, and geographical and other circumstances

-all factors which enable a nation to control and exploit the sea

during war time. One of the most important elements of sea power

is shipping, in which is still carried (and for an indefinite time to

come will continue to be carried) most of the men and commodities
that move across the sea. It would be just as unreasoning to con

sider sea power in te�ms of warships alone, as it would be to con
sider railroad trains in terms solely of locomotives.

A locomotive

represents power-true enough-but, without cars attached, it is
power with no functional meaning. And, without shipping naval ef�

forts are equally negative. We may keep the enemy from using the
sea, but that does not enable us to use the sea for ourselves.

Admiral Brown is Chief of Staff to the President of the Naval War
College.
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The history of most great wars is rich with examples of

shippings' contribution to the war effort. Most of the materials that

went into the British aircraft that hurled back the luftwaffe in the
Battle of Britain of 1940 were brought to the scene of operation

by ship.

soldiers,

Without shipping, not all of the guns, and tanks, and

and airplanes

in the world could have saved Britain. And

the same applies to the later bomber offensive against Germany.

Most of the men, and the food they ate, and the fuel and bombs

needed to mount that offensive, came across on a bridge of ships.
Russian might was kept in the war by the food and munitions we

sent across the sea. And Japan was defeated by the great American

advance that was literally floated across the vast reaches of the
Pacific.

We think of Germany's role in the last war as that of a land

power only.

But even she leaned heavily on her shipping.

She

needed it in the Baltic and the North Sea for support of her Russian

operations and for maintenance of her vital communications with
Scandinavia.

She used it coastwise between Germany, the Low

Countries, and France to relieve a heavily overburdened rail and

highway system. And while Italy remained in the fight and an

active front existed across the Mediterranean, shipping was an in- ·

dispensable means not only of handling Italian coastwise transporta

tion, but of maintaining military communications with the Axis

armies in North Africa.

And I might add parenthetically, the

Allied offensive against that shipping was the determining element
in forcing Rommel's retreat.

But nowhere was the need of shipping so compelling as it

was with Japan. It is curious that, upon the entrance of the United
States and Japan into war, the daily press made full comparison

of their relative naval strength, but forgot to note that Japan had

never more than nine million tons of shipping with which to carry on

commerce and military enterprises over a vast maritime area. It

2
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was never enough and, with increasing losses to our submarines, air
craft and other weapons, her national economy rapidly deteriorated
and then collapsed.
The ugly little tramp steamer thus occupies an important
quarter of the shield of naval power. It is less splendid than the
great aircraft carrier but no less vital. Both are ships and, to all
the embattled nations of the last war, there was nothing quite so
valuable as a ship. And it will continue to be so in the future. It

is a fundamental law of Physics. That is, you can build a huge tub
-call it a hull if you will-and float it on the surface of the water.
It floats by itself, mind you; it requires no power to keep it afloat.

You can fill it up with goods, or guns, or airplanes, or soldiers,
and with relatively little power you can move it cheaply to any

point you wish. There are no rails or roadbeds to worry about, no
mountains to cross, no tunnels to dig. It is by far the cheapest and

easiest means of transportation known to man. And the more our
civilization advances the 'more we will come to use this cheap and
easy road of the sea for all of our bulk transportation.

We are all familiar with the role of the naval airplane in the
last war. It was used for search, observation and reconnaissance
in,every phase, and so distinguished an officer as Admiral Spruance
has expressed the opinion that photographic reconnaissance alone
provided us with a wealth of vital material which could never have
been hoped for in the past and without which countless lives might
have been unnecessarily expended. The airplane also proved an in
valuable weapon in anti-submarine warfare, both in its own right
and as a closely articulated member of air-surface hunter-killer
teams. But it was with the aircraft carrier that �he naval airplane
achieved its most dramatic successes, for the part played by our
carriers was dominant and indispensable. They assured us a con
centration of air strength possessed of extreme mobility, range and
endurance. They spearheaded and supported our amphibious ad-
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vance at every long step in the Pacific.

The immense distances

and widely scattered defenses offered great opportunity for the em

ployment of these mobile forces which struck at great range and left
all but selected targets by-passed and isolated. In a war in which
command of the air was essential, they never failed to gain that
command at the required time and place. In a naval war, they
destroyed the enemy fleet and annihilated the air power of that

fleet. In an amphibious war, they excelled in the direct support
of troops. And all of these things, combined with the mobility

and long sea-keeping ability of the American Fleet, gave their at

tack a feature of continuous initiative and surprise revolutionary in
the progress of warfare.

Furthermore, we have now crossed a threshold.

Using

atomic bombs and other new weapons of science, the flexibility and
destructiveness of the carrier airplane has been increased many fold.

And the Navy, no longer shackled by the historic barriers of the

shoreline, can now strike telling blows deep in enemy territory. For,

with no intention of detracting from the land-based airplane but in

simple justice to its carrier-based sister, it must be recognized that
the aircraft carrier task force provides the only truly mobile air force
in the world. Not only the aircraft themselves, but their fields are
capable of rapid movement. It is therefore, a force with all of the

peculiar advantages of mobility such as the ability to concentrate

and the ability to achieve surprise while the land-based enemy

struggles to redeploy aircraft scattered over hundreds of fixed
fields which may be separated by thousands of miles. Redeploy

ment of aircraft to meet such threats is next to impossible, so the
blow must be absorbed by local defense forces. To be effective

the enemy must be strong everywhere, a most difficult thing to
achieve.

To state it in another way, the aircraft carrier may be said
to gather up and coordinate all the principles of war and employ

4
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them with prime emphasis on the principles of mass, movement
and surprise.
The carrier's compact, self-sufficient organization gives con
ditions very difficult to obtain ashore, particularly in advanced
theaters. The aircraft receive excellent upkeep and repair, and the
air crews live in surroundings which enhance efficiency and morale.
Air operations are served by a highly compact intelligence and com
munication organization which permits up-to-the-minute briefing
prior to take-off and precise control in the air. Cruising in enemy
waters, the task force is protected by its fighter patrols, a certain
number of which may be airborne during daylight periods, and by
its night fighters during darkness. These fighters are directed to
their interceptions by highly trained personnel using excellent radar
equipment. Radar picket vessels and airborne early warning sets
extend the effective range of this radar many miles beyond the
task force. Such enemy aircraft as can penetrate this fighter plane
defense are met over the task group by a truly tremendous concen
tration of anti-aircraft fire which, directed by radar, denies the
enemy planes the advantages of cloud cover and darkness. The
heavi�r shells, of course, are influence fused and explode when
passing within lethal range of an aircraft. An average fast carrier
task group of the last war had a concentration of over 1600 guns
to use in its defense. When translated into fire-power, gentlemen,
that means over 6,000 bullets per second or just under 200 tons of
steel every minute. This, in its ability to deliver hot metal, sur
passes any conceivable concentration of artillery ashore. It was
positively brutal and it is small wonder that even those Japs who
were not suicidally inclined grew to consider an anti-carrier
mission as almost automatic enrollment in the Kamikaze Corps.
· Before leaving the carrier, I would like to point out that
the carrier-based airplane is not and should not be considered as
a rival of the land-based airplane. The two are capable of a bril-
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liant partnership which can multiply rather than add to the over
all effectiveness of our effort. For in war, as in any organic phen
omenon, the whole is infinitely more than the mechanical sum of its
parts. Land-air power can and does operate over the seas and
not only should this be recognized, but it should be welcomed and
utilized to the fullest. By the same token it should be equally ap

parent and gratifying that sea-air power can operate over the land
with equal facility and effectiveness. The defenses of the enemy
can be spread thin by the more varied direction of sea-air power's

attack making easier the more inflexible approach of land-air
power. On the other hand, land-air power, by the crushing weight

of its sustained offensive, can aid and abet these rapier-like thrusts
of sea-air power. There is no duplication unless it is the duplica
tion of the "one-two" punch.

New weapons have had a profound effect upon the thinking of

us all. The blinding fury of atomic warfare unhappily represents
man's most significant conquest since the discovery of fire.

The

historic balance between offense .and defense has been utterly

destroyed.

To deny the impact of this on naval thinking would be

downright folly.

Indeed it would be courting disaster.

Every new weapon is a challenge to sea power; a challenge

to recognize it, utilize it, and defend itself against it-:-or perish.

Even those new weapons of the last war enormously complicated

our problems.

They opened new avenues to us, closed others, and

in many cases circumscribed the profitable employment of the Navy.
Today, we have atomic fission.

Tomorrow (when it comes and it

will come) we will have the ultra-long range guided missile with an

atomic head. We must, all of us-ground, sea and air-learn how
to utilize these weapons and how to defend ourselves against them.

Victory or defeat, when and if we must fight again, will hinge

upon the degree of our success in doing this.

6
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By the same token we must never permit our enthusiasm for
the new to cause us to prematurely discard the old. Certainly,
we must cast away garments which are moth-eaten. But we must
avoid swapping a serviceable coat for a new one that does not fit.
Our job is to sharpshoot; setting our sights neither too high nor too
low. We must come forth with , the most nearly correct answer
obtainable. We are no longer blessed with unlimited resources, and
we must be certain that those we have are divided in the most ef

fective manner.

In remembering that the war of tomorrow is to be fought
with new weapons, we must not forget that so was the war of yes
terday and the day before that. T�e unresting progress of mankind

causes continual changes in weapons.

Drastic change has been so

persistent during the last one hundred years that (if I might be

permitted to coin a phrase) change may be said to have become one
of the constants of strategy;
And a review of the past will warn us against the dangers

of being too quick to discard as well as too slow to adopt.

For

example, the opinions expressed between the last two wars on the

role of air in sea operations were too often founded on theory
motivated by personal prejudice.

And to a large degree the ut

terances of both visionary and reactionary were ultimately proved

false. Those who planned on naval engagements after the fashion
of Jutland and Trafalgar were bitterly disappointed.

Those who

scoffed at the menace of the airplane saw their dreams go up in the
black, greasy smoke at Pearl Harbor.

But those who proceeded,

because of the startling successes of submarines and aircraft, to

paint with reckless brush pictures of war taking place wholly in the

air or wholly under seas were found to be equally wide of the mark.

False proclamations were issued that navies were obsolete, that the

heavy bomber would interdict all sea lanes, that no ship could op-
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erate within reach of land-based airplanes, and so on; · predictions
which were not borne out by the experience of any warring nation.
Technology marches on a broad f�ont. Its progress is not
confined to those few implements whi�h, today, seemed favored of
the gods. Those impiements which, today, seem threatened with
extinction may sometimes use the same technology to develop to
morrow new means of offensive usage, thus furthering their in

trinsic merit, and new means of defending themselves, thus contin
uing their useful life. What we will then have will not be a retul'.n
. to the conditions of yesterday, but something new and distinctive.
It is a great misfortune that a discussion such as this can

seldom be indulged in without creating bitterness which generates
resistance and, in the end, delays progress. The simple fact is

that change must occur. To ignore it is disastrous. But revolutions
are seldom as complete as revolutionaries hope, and the wise man
must travel the unpopular and little publicized middle road, being
neither lulled by the wishful thinking of black reactionaries, nor
swept away by the rantings of wild-eyed enthusiasts.
But enough of the present.

Let us look into the future.
And as we look into that future we see many factors affecting the
employment of navies. But during the foreseeable future it is
equally clear that there will continue to be a place for navies

both their surface and air components. Indeed, so long as there
are oceans there will be ships. No serious student of sea power
(and these students are by no means confined to the naval pro

fession) has yet to suggest that sea power is on the way out. It
was no "happenstance" that the greatest of all air wars and the one
which saw the most titanic land battles of all times was also the
greatest of all sea wars. World War II saw sea power reach its
heights in its influence on history; not alone in the magnitude of
operations, but in the degree to which those operations contributed

8
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to final victory. And, in any great war in the future, sea power is
still as certain to be decisive as it formerly has been. Indeed, the

greatly increased quantity and complexity of equipment to be used
in future wars makes sea power even more important than ever
before.

Just as an army is useful in land warfare, for those who

propose to fight across the seas, a navy is a necessary possession.

In the hands of an intelligent and understanding high command it is
an invaluable weapon. And I might add this:

Sea power is the friend, ally and indeed the proud servant of

air power.

For, with the aid of land power, it can seize, develop

and support overseas air bases close to an enemy, thereby multi

plying the effectiveness of air power by many, many fold, For if we

cut the distance a bomber must fly in half we multiply its eff �ctive

ness by four. If we cut the distance down to one fourth, we mul

tiply its effectiveness by sixteen.

In other words, given the same

size air force, we will have sixteen times as many bombers to fight
a war at this range (indicating) as we would have if we were
forced to fight out at this range (indicating).

This old law of mathematics applies to all weapons from the

bow and arrow to the guided missile.

The day of the long range

guided missile is still many years in the future but, when it comes,
navies will still be needed to take it closer to the enemy.

weapons are enormously expensive.

Modern

This is true whether we are

speaking of a jet bomber costing several million dollars or an atomic

bomb the cost of which is a measurable percentage of our national

effort.

We must not waste them trying to hit a target thousands

of miles away when we have the means of getting much closer.

So much for the foreseeable future and, for that matter, the

predictable future which lies just beyond that.

But what of the

speculative future-the "wide· blue yonder", the day of the ultra-

9
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long range guided missile with an atomic head-what about sea
power then?
First, let us examine the most accepted version of warfare
in the atomic age. It seems universally conceded that, with our
present type of government, we must accept, not deliver the first
blow. I decline to subscribe to this gloomy view but, however you

view it, such warfare is not attractive. Cities will be vast catas
trophe areas, and the normal channels of communications and
transportation will be in unutterable confusion. Even the smaller
towns and the rural areas, though perhaps not struck directly, will
be in varying degrees of confusion and disorganization due to the
collapse of the metropolitan centers with which their economies are

intertwined.

Of course, a great deal can be done in the way of passive de

fense, such as going underground and decentralizing and reorgan

izing vital industries and services, and adopting other methods to
avoid complete paralysis of the nation. But the idea that a nation,

after weeks of atomic warfare, could achieve a fraction of the pro
duction of America, during World War II simply does not make
sense. The atomic war must be fought largely with stockpiles of
arms in their finished state. Stockpiles of raw materials may be
practically valueless; just as useless as that huge pile of gold we

kept buried in the ground throughout World War II. And incident
ally, let us not forget that gold too was once an essential sinew of
war, and it is most doubtful that our forefathers ever foresaw the
day when it would not be.
Thus it can be seen that our ability to strike back after an
atomic attack will depend upon the degree to which our armed
forces ·have made themselves independent of the urban communities
and their industries for supply and support. In the past our mili
tary establishments have simply been cadres which underwent
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enormous but slow expansion after the outbreak of war. Such ex
pansion cannot take place after an atomic attack. , The idea that
must be hammered home above all else is that practically the only
forces which will be able to fight after an atomic attack will con
sist of those already in uniform using the arms and equipment
already in the arsenals. And those arsenals must be in caves in the
wilderness or otherwise suitably dispersed, hidden, and protected.
It has been suggested (and the suggestion seems sound)
that the forces which will fight in an atomic war should be divided
into three elements. The first will be the "Retaliatory Force",
which will return the bombardment with our own atomic weapons.
This force must remain in sharp isolation from the national com
munity. Its functions must not be compromised in the slightest by
the demands for relief from the stricken areas. The "Retaliatory
Force" must either be a highly mobile sea force or one which has
been scattered over a large number of dispersed reservations. Pos
sibly it wiH be a combination of these two, but if a portion of the
"Retaliatory Force" is to occupy reservations, each reservation must
be of a considerable area to permit atomic explosives and their
carriers to be secreted and protected as much as possible by under
ground storage. The entire "Retaliatory Force" must have a com
pletely independent system of inter-communications, since the
supreme command may have been eliminated or its communications
disrupted almost immediately.
The second force will be known as the "Defensive Force". Its
mission will be to resist invasion, to defend against the bombard
ment of atomic missiles by whatever scentific means that have
been developed, to organize the relief of the stricken areas, and to
administer the interior along as nearly constitutional lines as pos
sible. Here, if anywhere, is the place for the citizen army. But it
must be admirably trained and capable of at least local mobilization.
There will be no time for training and nation-wide mobilization once

11
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atomic warfare starts. Perhaps the old ideal of the minute man with
his musket over the fireplace will be resurrected in suitably modern
ized form. In any event, adequate provisions will have to be made
for local mobilization, for maximum clecentralization of arms and
supply depots, and also for decentralization of tactical authority.
Strategical rather than tactical concentration will be necessary to
avoid high spatial density of military fQrces. And it must be again
emphasized that the arms, supplies and implements of transporta
tion to be depended upon will be those stockpiled in as secure a
ma11:ner as possible.
One more word about the Defensive Force, there is a popular
school of thought today that atomic war necessitates emphasis on
pure defense and the expenditure of vast sums on defense alone. I
cannot go along with this despite the hypothetical proofs advanced.
History is too replete with instances of the "Maginot Line" theories
that have fallen before a dynamic and well conceived offense. I do
not mean to say our defensive forces will. be unimportant, but no
aggressor nation will be discouraged from attacking us because of
the excellence of our defenses alone. She will be far more deterred
by visible evidence that we have the offensive potential to deal her
decisive blows.
And it is therefore to the operations of the third force
known as the "Offensive Force" to which your most thoughtful at
tention is invited. The outcome of the war, the decision as to who
is victor and who is vanquished (a sorry distinction at best in
times of atomic warfare) will depend upon the strategic. situation
existing after about the first sixty days of war. I know of only two
factors influencing the strategic situation after the first sixty days
of atomic war. One is morale, always a gambler's choice when
dealing with the speculative future. Building up a national morale
of such toughness and resiliency that it can withstand the shock of
this type of warfare is a matter of supreme importance to the mili-
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tary thinker, but it is beyond the scope of the present discussion.
mention it now simply to indicate my recognition of the problem.

I

But let us return to the remaining factor influencing the

strategic situation after the first sixty days of atomic warfare. This
factor will be based upon the degree of success of the "Offensive

Force". Remember the "Retaliatory Force" is engaged in bringing

the enemy down to our own level. The "Defensive Force" is avoid
ing titter chaos. If the "Offensive Force" can seize and rapidly de
velop a section of enemy territory which dominates the enemy's

vital areas then that force will be in a position to continue the
initial retaliatory bombardment on a far more effective scale. Not

only that but it will relieve pressure on the homeland, since much
of the enemy's resources must be directed against the captured
area. Thus we draw double on our money since the effectiveness

of our own bombardment is increased while the effectiveness of the
enemy's bombardment is decreased.
Obviously, the' "Offensive Force" must be completely pro

. fessional and trained to the utmost degree.

The target to be

seized must be of a considerable area but, since the forces available
will be limited, it must also be one which can be fairly easily con
quered and even more easily defended from reconquest.

And it

should be repeated that it must be one that dominates the enemy's
vital areas.
Extreme swiftness of invasion will be of inestimable value.
This makes the employment of air power most inviting and un

questionably it will be utilized to the· limit. But the invasion,
occupation, development and support of a considerable area solely

or even chiefly · by air would be an incredibly difficult task, even

if we assume a minimum of air opposition. The task of the of
fensive force is obviously one tailored to sea power. But it must
be a sea power geared to atomic warfare. Its organization, logis-
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tics and tactics must conform to the requirements of atomic war
fare. Ordinary harbors and ports as we know them will be use
less. Supplies, replacements and spare parts must be loaded over
the beaches from dispersed, hidden and protected arsenals. All

ships must be kept adequately dispersed at all time�even prior
to· the outbreak of hostilities. The invasion force itself must be
already embarked, or at least capable of swift embarkation from

hundreds of isolated points for, almost immediately, all ships must
be ready to .proceed to predetermined rendezvous and from thence

to the chosen objective, where a swift invasion will be undertaken
·,\ utilizing surprise to the utmost. It will be an herculean task, in

\rolving not only the seizure of territory but its development with
·�credible rapidity into launching sites suitably separated and ade
q��teiy supplied.
There briefly sketched, is one version of warfare in the

atomic age. As mentioned at the beginning, it is not a pretty pic
ture. It is unnecessary to say that we all most fervently hope the

world will be spared this Armageddon. But in the calamitous
event that it cannot, our job as always will be to win the war. We
must realize. that a reasonable state of readiness by past· standards

may invite disastrous defeat in the future. During the transitional
years that lie ahead of us, our thinking and our planning must re

main broad and flexible to insure that we achieve a maximum state
of readiness at all times.

Perhaps most of you will feel that I have painted a much
too gloomy picture of the future. Well, I agree. I have my per
sonal doubts that atomic warfare, horrible as it may be, will ever
reach the cataclysmic proportions I have outlined. But a good
planner must plan for the worst and hope for the best, and I have
simply chosen the worst situation so that we might examine the
role of sea power under such conditions. Actually, as I have said,
I question the ability of even the atomic bomb to so completely
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destroy such vast areas as our land presents. Further than that, I

refuse to subscribe to a doctrine of despair. I decline to accept it
as our inescapable fate that we must suffer the full measure of

destructiveness this terrible weapon does possess. I heartily sub
scribe to the homely old saying that: "There ain't no holt what can't
be broke." Science presented us with atomic warfare. Science must
provide defenses against it.

She may not, indeed probably

cannot find a complete answer, but she

must

give us something

which will offer humanity a more reasonable chance of survival

than the measures that I, as an unscientific student of warfare,
have been able to outline today.

But, whatever the specific changes indicated by atomic war
fare, this much is clear. Our military leaders must bestir- them

selves to a wholly unprecedented degree in revising military con
cepts inherited from the past.

They must be prepared to dismiss

as possibly irrevelant lessons learned the hard way in the last war.

This will not be easy. It would be much easier if we had lost the
war, or had our leadership been stupid, blundering or marked by

unnecessary delay in adjustment. But such a judgment is not cor
rect in spite of the malicious slander of lesser men.

I do not con�

tend that no mistakes were made. But, on the whole, our leader

ship was unquestionably brilliant and remarkable in its flexibility.
Our ground forces proved to be masters of mechanized and amphib

ious warfare, our navy was not found wedded to the battle-line,

crossing-the-"T" type of warfare (and don't let anyone ever tell

""

you that, no matter who he may be-no navy ever handled air

power more intelligently or effectively) and our air force, though

sincerely wedded to the theory of pure air power, rendered timely

and invaluable close air support to the sister services.

The problems we face today have grown too great to be

solved by the "specialized" thinking of the pa1;1t.

The crying need
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today is for large numbers of military thinkers who collectively

will represent a "super" Clausewitz or a "super" Mahan-brilliant

strategists, not of land power, not of sea power, and not of air

power, but able broad-gauged individuals who can view the whole

picture of

military strategy and come forth with

well-reasoned and

dispassionate answers to the warfare of the future. I am not speak
ing of a super general staff, but of the leaders within the several

services.

Perhaps such paragons can be found just as great needs

in the past gave us an Abraham Lincoln or a George Washington.

But they will not come unless the irresistable urge is built up to find
them, to know whom we seek.

This means that those of us of the

military cloth must cease our "compartmentalized" thinking.

We

must realize that we are not, per se, army officers, naval officers, or
air force officers.

We are

military

officers (and by God we are

Americans too!) and we must, each of us according to our several

talents, strive to see the broad picture without personal or service
bias.
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ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR WAR
A lecture delivered by

Professor W. Y. Elliott
at the Naval War College
November 19, 1948

This is a second installment, but the President of the War
College has suggested that I refresh your minds on the whole prob

lem before emphasizing supply problems and organization.

On the Economic Potential of the United States for War,
what J want to do first is to lay before you some problems that
seem to me to "set" this problem itself in terms of the questions
it involves. What do we mean by "economic potential" and what

do we mean by "the United States for war''? I don't mean to get
into semantics. I do· not think that would . be very profitable. I
propose to make a plain, common sense analysis of what you're up
against.

The main job I had to do in the first three and one half years

of the last war (from 1940) was to concern myself with the strategic

imports problem. I don't think it is necessary to indicate the im
portance of that problem to you, but it obviously has the most di

rect bearing on the question about which we are talking at the
moment. Economic potential for war can be studied in terms of
the import program and the deficiency materials almost as well as
from any other angle because you have to study the things that
we have and our production potential as well as what _we haven't.
When you have a deficiency in strength and when you know the

processes through which these materials come, you understand
what the "United States" and "war" really means. It means the
Professor Elliott is Professor of Government at Harvard University
and was the wartime Vice Chairman of WPB. This is the second of
two lectures by Professor Elliott on the subject of economic potential.
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world. The potentialities of the United States have to dra� on the
world.
Now that is, unfortunately, a lesson that is not generally
recognized in a great deal of top-level planning in Washington. The
assumption is that the Navy is an old fashioned instrument of war

fare which somehow is a little bit out-moded by the fact that you
can fly over large areas of the world and deliver knock-out punches

if you can get there, not "fustest with the mostest men", which was

Bedford Forrest's formula, a fellow Tennessean's, but get there
with something lethal in the way of a knock-out punch. But you

have to get there also to mop up, even if you can deliver such a
punch, and you have to get there to protect yourself, in the first
instance, with the supplies for bases from which you can deliver

these knock-out punches. Like a great many other problems which

you study and are much more expert with than I profess to be, this
is a primarily military aspect of our national strategy. I hope our
top-planning is good because everything else depends on this esti

mate.

Just common sense thinking on this point would indicate

that the protection of our sea-lanes is necessary to get in over

200 strategic materials. (260 were on our W. P. B. list at the end of

the war). On the A. N. M. B. strategic and critical list today you
have about fifty or sixty materials and you have another hundred
that are doubtful and would soon become critical and strategic.
Just take my word for it, they will all be there within six months

of the time any war is fought, because wars always develop more

shortages than anyone has foreseen.

The first proposition that I want to call to your attention,
then, is that when we are talking about the United States at war,

we are talking about the United States drawing on any accessible
parts of the world. The places we can control in the world, the
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sea la�es that are available to us, (to which I propose to return)
the places that are not likely to be interdicted by communist ac
tivities (and that is a very real part of our equation from here
on out) become critical to the success of stockpiling to prevent our
being dependent on areas where we are likely to be interdicted
from materials which we may desperately need. Our potential
depends on control of sea-lanes and producing territories.
What about the rest of our own United States' economic
potential at this time? Let us start off with an analysis of that
and break it down into the three points that I have suggested to
you: . (1) our natural resources that we have to depend on for
the entire raw material supply of this country (and that includes
food-stuffs and all the agricultural production in a very definite
way because we are going. to have to feed other people as we
always have) ; (2) our industrial capacity, and (3) our manpower.
Those are the three basic factors, if I understand them, that enter
into any economic picture of war potential. Industrial facilities
and capacities, of course, are the things that get most of the at
tention-the things we spent most of our time wrestling with in
the War Production Board, though without the other factors being
in balance, they sometimes got out of balance. Industrial facil
ities could be useless without adequate transportation, raw ma
terials, components, and manpower, in a proper balance. Some
times production suffered very greatly even in the war in which we
were protected the last time by the intervention of that Providence
which seems to have a peculiar concern for us, along with the other
objects of its traditional affectioh which I need not name.

No Slack in Our Present Peace Time Economy.
At the present moment we are absolutely at capacity in steel
and are far behind requirements-five million tons at least. We are
not able to meet our needs in the production of electrical energy,
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(which is an absolutely critical factor, as you gentlemen all know,
for all our war potential). We are short in the mining of every non
ferrous metal in the picture, and we need all the iron ore that we
We are not at capacity in coal, but we are
pretty close to it, and any slackening of that front would be serious.
We are at capacity in metallurgical and by-products coke. We are
can lay our hands on.

desperately short of scrap for steel making purposes. Scrap is the
biggest single.limiting factor in steel production today, apart from
strikes (which we hope will not be in the picture but may be if
the inflationary spiral is not controlled).

If you take the three or four other lines that are absolutely

vital to war, such as the production of specialized bottleneck items:

gauges, compressors, valves, (the things that you gentlemen know

held up the escort vessel program when �e got into a very tight
jam last time)-those things are pretty well within capacity.

We are behind in the oil country goods, which is the

major factor in petroleum production today, so that you can't
get 24 inch pipe orders on any mill until 1951.

I mean that

the existing orders are not going to take care of the production of
petroleum in an adequate volume.

It is a world picture I am talk

ing about, which we are having to supply.

Petroleum is domestical

ly now just about within peacetime demand, with no reserve for
100 octane production and other products for war.
Now that is only

peacetime

economy.

.any big slice out of that for defense today.

You are not taking

You will next
' year

(1949) take a bigger slice and with the lend-lease program for
Europe, that is in my judgment quite certain to go into effect.
I
think the stage is set. You'll take a much bigger slice out in later

years; but you won't take a "wartime" slice out of it, unless we
have a war. So that when you are talking about war potential you
have to squeeze it out of present civilian requirements, or find
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additional facilities, (which in the main do not exist at this time)
in order to carry a wartime load.

Now that is exactly the cold

factual situation that you are up against-no slack in the indus

trial economic potential for war requirements and none likely un

less we hit a severe depression.

You haven't any factor in the 1948 situation that does not

correspond in some way to the situation which we confronted in

1�40, but there was slack in the production facilities then avail

able.

When I went down in May 1940 with Don Nelson, Bill Batt

and Ed Stettinius and the rest of them, (and they were pretty

much recruited from the Business Advisory Council, a group of
people who had been working on this in one way or another for a

long time) we had some slack, though we didn't have

enough slack.

Yet we faced the same general problem then that we have today.

If

you were going to increase steel facilities, for instance, adequate to

get wartime production of steel up to the figures that we regarded

as necessary, somewhere approaching 90 million tons, (and there

were a lot of people who said that 100 million tons would be neces
sary, if we were to do the job) every ton you took out to increase

steel capacity in 1940 wasn't getting the bait back until three
years later, and you were taking it out of current production in the

meantime.

How much steel could we invest in a long run expan

sion? Could we squeeze it out, without hurting immediate rearma
ment needs?

Today we confront that same problem, only in a more ex

aggerated form, because steel capacity was then running at about

three fourths capacity at the most, and we had some leeway to ex

pand against existing capacity. We don't have that leeway of steel
capacity today.

We have furnaces that have been running until

they are, in many instances, worn out and badly in need of re

placement.

Some of them are being replaced and steel production is
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suffering somewhat in consequence. . Expansion in steel is going on,

but we won't list a 100 million ton figure at present rates before
1952.
There is, to sum this all up, a peculiar kind of handicap,
from a wartime point of view, in our present full employment
economy. Everybody is used to this high plateau of civilian con

sumption; plans are going ahead on that basis. We are not an easy
economy to plan for war, even on a sensible basis of preparedness
before the event.

Now I hasten to add that that is not all a bad

proposition because a lot of new industrial capacity is being put in
which can be, with very little conversion, used for war time pur
poses out of this new peak civilian requirements load. You are

dealing with an economy strained to its utmost with the E. C. A.
program on its back, with increasing demands confronting you next

year,

certainly

increasing demands for our own military require

ments. There isn't any possible doubt that the outcome of this
election did not affect that in any very serious way, although

whether it would have been greater or less is a matter· of specula
tion. In any case, we are committed to an increase in the arming
of this country and we are, though not as yet definitely committed,
almost morally committed to a rearming of considerable parts of
western Europe and certainly China, if it remains in the picture.
It looks as if enough of it had a chance of remaining there to re
quire

some rearming at any rate. This load will include a larger

share for the recovery of Japan. We have been guilty of allowing
the Japanese economy to remain relatively idle and almost use

less for even its own recovery and a direct drain on us, much as we
have handled the German economy up to quite recently. Both must
be put to work or they too drain our economy instead of helping
to rebuild the world on our side of the Iron Curtain.
Now I want merely to throw in a footnote at this stage,

which I intend to develop later.

Whether or not we have inflation
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in this country within the next eighteen months, possibly within the
next year, in steel products, including pipe lines, oil country goods,

is very largely a matter of using available German production.

We should be able to draw upon Germany, as we could with any

kind of consistent and absolutely all-out effort, if we brushed aside

the objection of the British to the competition being reestablished

and if we retained in Germany the steel capacity that is there. There
is sixteen million tons of annual steel capacity in the western zones

which is, at present, producing at the rate of seven million tons of

steel a year.

Nobody would have given you five cents last year for

the~ chances of its producing at a rate of more than six million tons
by this time, at the outside limit.

the seven million rate.

It's actually producing at above

We have to get more Swedish iron ore in that picture, or

iron ore in adequate quantities and adequate volumes from some

where else.
portation.

We have to do something .more about German trans

But if we were running a war we would do these

things. That was precisely the kind of thing we

did have to do dur

ing the last war, and that would be the biggest check to inflation
that this country has faced.

And gentlemen, inflation is the great

est danger of starving our military programs and our overseas
objectives all across the board.
analysis?

I don't think so.

see whether I am.

Now a_m I wrong in that simple

But I want to develop it for you to

On our own potential we are short at least five million
tons (some say up to ten) of ingot steel to meet the total requirements that are going to be_ put on us by the combination of

military programs, lend-lease included, the E. C. A., whatever we

do for the rest of the world.

The Commerce Department esti

mates run as high as seven million tons of basic steel, while the

Interior Department estimates are quoted at the higher figure of
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ten. This includes the commercial steel export for the world which
we can't cut off without simply wrecking South America, etc. That
steel capacity for quick use exists in Germany and nowhere else.
There isn't the capacity for developing that steel making capacity
in the U. S. A. under three years' time. Six million tons of Ger
man steel capacity are due for scraping. We agreed to do this under
the pressure of the Russians, and with some backing of the British
who didn't like this competition, and because the French thought
at the time of Potsdam-and until recently that they ought to con
trol the Ruhr and destroy or take over that steel-making capacity.
Now those are all factors that need to be dealt with but I can't
get into them too extensively here.
Transportation Equipment and Oil Country Goods as Shortage Items
Now second is transportation equipment, which is the limit
ing factor in the second major inflationary item with which we are
confronted namely; the development of minerals all over the world,
transportation equipment, oil country and mining equipment. That's
steel. If you have the steel you have the capacity in most places,
and you have German capacity, much of which is being disas
sembled at this good moment and shipped, some of it behind "the
Iron Curtain". It is an incredible thing to be shipping big pipe
making equipment even to Tito, and certainly to ship it to Czecho
slovakia, Poland or Rumania. We have stopped shipping it, for the
time being, to Russia because of the counter-blockade to Berlin.
But we are always apparently willing to do a deal along those lines
and go on with it at some time when things get a little bit tougher.
It is always held out as a bait, twenty-five per cent of reparations
equipment from the Western zones of Germany is still earmarked
for shipment to Russia today in the I. A. R. A. allocations of this
stuff in Germany. That apparently cannot be touched, even though
Congress has passed a law which says that the E. C. A. should get
a new deal on this whole business and should use that steel
24
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capacity for the recovery of all of Europe.

Since we were putting

new money into Western Europe that never was contemplated when
the reparations were originally settled, we should have a new settle

ment of the whole problem to use that money where it would be used
most quickly and effectively.

Lend-Lease as Military Insurance for our Huge Stake in Europe.
Now obviously we do not want to build up that capacity for

armament purposes before there are fifty European divisions,

British and American divisions, able to stop the Russian armies
from overrunning Europe. It would be a tragic folly if we were
to build up heavy armaments in France in response to de Gaulle's
pressures.

To build them up in England makes more sense, but

to build, them up in France makes no sense whatever. Their en
tire steel production, their entire recovery program, ought to be
geared into recovery items in light arms.

The mass production of

heavy armament ought to be entirely restricted to the United States

until you have such protection that you know that you are not de
livering over the entire arms industry to Russia.

I suggest to you gentlemen, if you have anything to do with

these staff conversations, get that thinking into the picture, or at

least think about it yourself to see whether it belongs in the picture,
because the pressures are all going to be to go through the same
old pattern of having uncoordinated equipment. I like the G. P. F.;

it's a darn fine gun, and it was in 1917, but it is not the kind of
proposition into which to turn steel with the French methods of pro
duction. This is particularly true until you are sure that it won't be
turned against you. Tanks and even cruisers and Naval arms
make no sense whatever in terms of building that kind of thing up

at the price of "recovery" steel today, inside Europe. Please think

that one over, in view of the tightness of steel at the present time!

Use German steel for European recovery; keep the heavy arma-
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ments for Europe in this country mainly, with Britain perhaps

providi;ng her own on a coordinated basis.
than steel and minerals are easing.

Other commodities

If I have emphasized steel,' ,it is only because steel is the

key-index to war production.

We· found that out in the control

material plans that Ferd Eberstadt (for whom I'll say a good word

a.s a boss, because he was my boss), had the guts to ram down the
throats of many reluctant people in the war.

It's the index;

everything gears into steel production and that's the reason I have
been emphasizing it.

But there are nine other items at which, in

this country, we are chock-a-block at full capacity.

We have eased off in food production, that is no longer an

inflationary item.

Can we expect the climatic cycle not being re

peated indefinitely?

We have had eight good crop years on end.

I don't know, Joseph's interpretation of Pharaoh's dream may not

be the right one, "Seven lean years and seven fat years", you re

member the Bible. (I hope the Navy hasn't stopped studying the
Bible because you've got to seek comfort somewhere these days!)

But we are due for a drought year pretty soon.

We have had the

most magnificent and incredible miracle of/ crop production and

climatic luck in the world, and so we can't count on that indefin

itely. But, thank heavens, for the moment, food is on the decline

i

as an inflationary item and certainly you are as concerned with

it as I, a professor.

That item in the family budget is still tough;

it is still bad, but not a critical item.

Still we might do well to

keep our elevators reasonably full as Pharaoh did, against emer
gencies. Crop failures still occur and food is a mighty weapon in
war.

Textiles are out of the inflationary woods. Textile pro
duction is now sagging for lack of demand. . The day of six and
seven dollar shirts, I venture to say, may be over. You can go
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through consumer dur1:1,ble goods, too, and things of that order
(except where they are closely related to steel production) and
the consumers non-durable goods, the kind of goods like automobiles
and things of that sort and, by and large, the market is getting
along towards a saturation point. So you are really out of the
woods in most of these items, but you are not in these basic factors
that effect the elements of munition supply and war production,
which are most important-the ones I named beginning with steel,
electricity, petroleum, the minerals, building materials, etc.
Now what does that spell? It spells, if I understand it, two
things: first, that in order to get the potential for war production
geared up, we have to gear it up now! We are looking right down
the possibility of a war at any moment. There is, however a most
encouraging thing about it to me. I was a civilian require
ments planner and fought the last year of the war with Vogue and
Harper's Bazaar and Vanity Fair to keep the dresses short, not
because I was interested in the least in admiring the legs of the
ladies, necessarily, but because I had to save cloth, so that you
gentlemen could have enough uniforms and all the other things
you wanted, including enough sleeping bags to sleep everybody in
the Army double, from here to kingdom come. I fought that bat
tle both ways-to cut sleeping . bags down and keep dresses up.
We did keep the dresses short here. When Moscow adopted the
new look the other day I breathed a sigh of relief. I don't believe
that Vossneshensky, the old Politbouro planner there, would have
let them put the skirts down until he thought there wasn't much
danger of an immediate all-out war. He is a pretty careful kind of
planner; his neck depends on it.
I suspect that is a very good sign that the cold war is
going to be cold for a while-that taken along with a lot of other
things. Although the Soviets aren't set for it today, they could
overrun Europe any time they wanted to, and the temptation to do
it u:p.der conditions of stress, might force them to do it even when
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plan to do it.

they don't

That's the tragedy of it.

So, looking down

the guns that way, we as a nation, living in fat and security and
comfort and all of that kind of thing, just can't bring ourselves

to take the necessary steps to plan for such a struggle as may burst
upon us. We take comfort in the new look coming from Moscow and

other hopeful omens.

Particularly unless we can mobilize the re

sources of these occupied countries, Germany and Japan, we still

have a great inflationary strain on our system that is almost un

bearable, and can be politically dangerous. We are asked to bear
too much.

"The weary Titan", as Joseph Chamberlain once said

about the British Empire way back in 1902 when it was far from

being true perhaps but he was predicting a true future, "The

weary Titan staggers under the too vast load often his fate."
is we who now play the Atlas holding up the world.

It

We must

keep our people willing to support this load, and the only way I

can see to do it is to mobilize the resources of other people for re

covery purposes in Europe, while keeping the production of the

things that are absolutely essential

now

in this country where we

can control and coordinate their production and where we can con
trol the arms and munition supply.

I needn't allude to the South American arms program, which

needs to be restudied in the light of this total global picture. The
uses of that program I think are too apparent to need comment.

When you control the sources, you control a great many other

things too.

It is exceedingly important, gentlemen, it seems to

me, that we should think in terms which are, after all, entirely

legitimate terms of national interest to the people who are going
to bear the brunt of it in the long run, so far as the sacrifices are
concerned.

Now I hasten to add that the Europeans, on their part, have
got quite a legitimate grievance if we begin to talk about aban

doning them, and if any misleading talk comes to them that we
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may retire behind the Pyrenees or something of that sort.

That

is not a good line of doctrine, particularly if we consider psychol

ogical aspects of the cold war.

Let us talk about fifty divisions,

(their divisions mostly), equipped and put into the field so that

the European people will not have the feeling which they legiti

mately do have today-that they may be the first to have heads

roll.

Until we can coordinate ourselves with an Atlantic agree

ment, backed by actual divisions along the lines presently being
studied, they will still have that feeling.

So everything I'm saying

is predicated, from my point of view, on the fact that we all can,

with certainty and speed, stop the Russians in their "irresistible
power" that they have on a purely relative basis today.

it can be done, but you are better judges of that than
it to you.

I

I think

am, I leave

Perhaps the whole psychology of Europe could be

changed by fifty reliable, high powered! divisions and plenty of

tactical aircraft (not just long range strategic bombing) if you
have got them in a position where they can be used.

The trick

is to get the psychology that will make these divisions really re

liable.

which

Now with that assumption, the second line of argument

I

am going to lay down is that we must be prepared at the

outset in the United States, to take the most drastic measures with

our economy that anybody has ever contemplated.

And I am speak

ing to you as an Ex-Vice Chairman of the W. P. B. for civilian

requirements, the Director of the Office of Civilian Requirements.

What we did last time would be completely inadequate, because at

the outset of any war today we would have to face two things

that did not exist in this last war.

More Drastic Cuts in the Civilian Economy would be Needed

for a Future War.

Now let me start off by saying this, so that I may make
clear to you that I am not trying to sell out the civilian economy
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which I really value and whose importance I think the military
often do not understand. Certainly Lucius Clay didn't always un
derstand it last time. Others in the armed services had a very im
perfect understanding of it, if I may put it that way. You can't
stop the civilian population from rolling around in automobiles
completely, without stopping men from going to work in war
plants. Our transportation system is not like that of some other
countries, geared to bicycles. We do depend on the automobile to
get around, and it is very important that we should have an en
forceable provision for legitimate users of gasoline to get it. But
it's going to have to cut a lot deeper and a lot farther, if we are
going to support a war effort again, than we ever thought about
last time.
Why? Not only are we at peak of consumption today in
many lines. In special areas we have added to our national bur
den. We've turned everybody to the use of petroleum for fuel. I
just installed a new oil heater in the gardener's house over next
door. I turned to oil because it was easier. It's expensive but it's
easier. If I'm going to put some of my family over there or rent
it to somebody, they will want an oil heater. That's a very waste
ful use of a very vital natural resource. A country that was prop
erly run, on a long-time interest, wouldn't permit that. That's
right. It really wouldn't permit the use of petroleum resources
for immobile fuel purposes where coal was adequate. But we do
and we are all geared up to it, and it would wreck a large part of
the whole economy if you pulled it out. Petroleum is just one of those
things that's right up to the notch today, or just about. Not only
fuel oil but distillates and crudes.

Dangers Through Sabotage.
But there is a more important danger-loss of production
by sabotage. What would happen if we got the additional factor
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of sabotage on a wide scale, as we will certainly get in the only

future war we are likely to have to fight.

When I set up the

lecture on civilian requirements which I made at the Industrial

War College, they asked me to figure aut what the civilian re
quirements ought to be next time, in fifty minutes of an off-hand

talk at the college. Out of the richness of my experience, would it
be enough to go back to the 1936 averages the way we used to do,

and say that we could squeeze along that way with rationing?
No, that won't do at all!

You m1;1st have three alternative plans

to confront a war today in terms of the damage that's done, the

cutting off of natural resources, and the levels at which you have
to cut civilian requirements.
One of them is the "soft" plan, which would probably never
go into effect, but for purposes of propaganda you might keep it
on the books. That would be a plan like last time. The minute

war broke out, the minute you were confronted with a war to
morrow sometime, you'd have to go into at least a second plan,

which would be the "moderate" plan, though a tough plan it

would be too.

We should have to cut, in my judgment, twenty

five to forty per cent below anything we saw last time, all across

the board, and maybe farther than that depending on whether you

got hold of the schnorkel submarine warfare quickly. I don't know

how you feel about that, but the gentlemen who do scientific sound

ranging stuff up at Harvard don't seem so optimistic about it.

After your adventures up in Newfoundland recently maybe there is
some little doubt in the minds of other people.

would cut back about where Britain was in 1943.

The second plan

I would think that you should count on really severe sabo

tage and really heavy losses as the basis for a third plan, so that
you really would be 'geared into something where your planning
would be adequate to meet potential disaster.

I can't see how
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strategic planning today can be otherwise than in terms of alter
native plans with depth of degree. That sort of cut would leave the
civilian economy with little except its past fat and repair parts

to live on.

Now if that is correct about the war potential of the United
States, what looks like a very healthy situation from the point of

the highest volume of steel production that we have ever achieved in
peacetime, of very elaborate industrial mechanism, some plants

still on ice from the last war that we could turn back to for muni

tions production and so on, is far from being a guarantee of
adequacy.

.

How Much of .the World do we Carry on our Backs?
With what Help?
Let me ask you what you mean when you say "the United

States at War?"

What kind of war?

How much of the world do

we support by our effort? That will affect the problems I haven't

spoken about yet.

this country.

Why today we have four months' manganese in

Four months' manganese is hardly an industrial

stock for operating purposes.

Industry

never

got below about a

year's operating stock, except in a disastrous time in World War

I when we nearly ran out. And if we ever ran below fifteen months
in the last war we got worried, terribly worried.

do it as a rule.

So we just didn't

Even when we were tightest, we found bottoms

from somewhere (lucky they were going out to those areas any

how) to load manganese from India.

There are 400,000 tons of

manganese above ground in India waiting to be moved today. The

Indian government is apparently willing to move it if we have the
steel to swap for manganese.

It

looks as though we might do it if

the State Department can make up its mind that this is the kind of
thing that is respectable for a sovereign government to do. I
don't know why we shouldn't, and unless we do, we are not going
to get that manganese.
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It is the same kind of deal we have for Takorati battery
grade ore; I don't think that the American interests concerned are

quite playing ball with us there. They may need more help, but
they don't show great �lacrity to increase production.
The E. C. A. doesn't seem to be moving in these areas

adequately and fast enough. They are not taking into account
these long range development plans. They are not allocating funds

to the colonies ear-marked for colonial development. They haven't
brought in Southern Rhodesia in the bilateral agreements. As far

as I can make out little has been done about the car supply to get
the chrome out of Rhodesia, and Rhodesia hasn't even acceded to
the agreements that are part of the E. C. A. program. The British
say its a self-governing dominion now. Whenever they want it to
be a self-governing dominion, it is one too, but when they don't,
they run it.

Legally it is still not self-governing.

The car supply

there is absolutely vital and the British have at last, bless their
souls, put a good railroad manager down there. They are beginning
to move, but in the meantime there are hundreds of thousands of
tons of fine chrome backed up for the lack of railroad cars-bogie
wagons and agreements on the part of Portugal to use Beira more

efficiently. We used to argue bogie wagons during the war, but
when they had to have bogie wagons we got them for them.

Why not use our Bargaining Cards?
The port of Beira needs fixing up some.

You'd better get

interested in that one. You may have some work to do there, if
you are going to get this stuff out. Lourenco Marques may bear

some attention too, and it's one of those deals in which you'd think
we would be able to have some bargaining power. We are going
to have to learn to use our whole bargaining weight with the E. C. A.

in one way or another. The Portuguese don't take many grants or
loans, but they are beneficiaries.

They are taking short materials
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that require export licenses from this country and it looks as
though we could find some way to reason with them.
If the United States is going to be built up for the needed
war potential we must take steps of this character to increase
mineral supplies in time. The State Department says, "We can
not understand why Russia doesn't cut us off of manganese today."
Well I understand that, I think. It is very much to the advantage
of Russia to have us dependent on them for twenty per cent of our
manganese, and twenty-five per cent or more for metallurgical
chrome, isn't it? If you could get this country dependent for its
industrial structure to that degree on Russia, wouldn't you think
that would be a sizeable advantage from the Kremlin's point of
view? I would. In other words we didn't need a ton of that stuff
from them to run the biggest war in history and supply them with
eleven billion dollars worth of lend-lease during the war and a lot
after. Today we are in the incredible position, in our chief basic
materials, of depending on Russia to that degree, and at a growing
rate. It isn't necessary! The slightest bit of drive to clean these
things up would see to it that we got the bogie wagons into Rhodesia
in return for additional and speeded up deliveries.
It is possible to deal with people on that basis. It has been
done before, and it can be done again. The E. C. A. has the great
est persuader in the world if they are prepared to use it: funds of
enormous proportions to go on colonial development. But if we
give them as unconditioned grants to the colonial powers of course
we won't get stockpiles from added production.

Useful Hints on Mobilizing Manpower from British Experience.
I'm going to pass over man power very briefly. I said
some things about it in a lecture at the Industrial War College and
I don't want to repeat those here. It's quite clear that no kind of
manpower handling like that of the last war would fit the all-out,
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full employment, situation that we confront today. The British
handled that problem under conditions of much greater severity
and strain, and bless their souls, they showed they could take it.
They did an awfully good job; we can learn a great deal from them.

I suggest that we should study their methods. One of the smart
things they did was to put the man who is running their foreign
policy today, Mr; Bevin, in charge of running their labor and man

power problems for a considerable part of the.war, and a labor man
was in there even when Bevin wasn't. In other words, British

labor had a feeling that they were doing it through somebody who
understood their problems and who was their man, but they were
all out for saving England and they were prepared to do it.
Now it would manifestly be impossible today to rely upon
merely the incentives of higher wages in war industries, or some,.
thing of that character, to deal with the manpower problem. I
dare say at this good moment for the period of cold war, we could
rely upon companies turning over to the government for their use,
men from these companies, on quite the generous basis they did
even in the last war. There must be a safeguarding of the jobs for
people on the higher levels in companies, just as much as there was
the safeguarding of G. I. jobs. Otherwise we are going to find it
very difficult to get top men who are free of strings. There must

be an increase in salaries paid to top-level executives in the govern
ment if you don't want to have just "dollar a year" men. I think

the latter behaved, in the main, with complete integrity. I have
absolute confidence in the ones that I knew in my own shop. But

it's an awkward position. Sometimes they had to lean over back
ward against their own companies, because they were exposed to the

feeling that they were still employees of the company from whom
they were drawing their pay'.

future prospects.
war.

That didn't always improve their

Many of them looked for other jobs, after the
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Manpower demands an approach in terms of a total mobili
zation. If we are "all-out" next time, that may be an entirely dif
ferent kind of proposition from what we have .been looking for. And
I think, there too, the plans ought to be made on three levels. One
would be a MacNutt manpower program if I may call it that. Mac
Nutt did an honest job, as best he could, with the kind of man
power set-up that he had and under the political directives that he
was given. I think you have to say that. He is a good politician
· and he did an honest job, the best he could. But that isn't going to
be the kind of job that you can do and get by with next time. · So
that the war potential depends upon the setting up of plans now.

Strategy of War Affects all Planning and use of Potential.
But can they be set up now for this drastic kind of war?
Sometimes you must be baffled by political limits to your own mili
tary planning. I'm not going to try to outline the war plans you
people make, but pretty clearly any kind of war is going to be an
"all-out" war, even if it has the most limited objectives in the
beginning, and even if you use your resources according to the
maxim of Bedford Forrest (as I hope you will) and try to knock out
the oil supply of the Russians (which would be the sensible, smart
thing to do). If we had done that to the Nazis earlier, instead of
knocking out ball-bearings and knocking ourselves out, it would
have been much better. As soon as you can cripple an army from
moving, they become a horde and it doesn't take many divisions to
stop a horde. It seems simple, and all things ought to be reduced
to simplicity if they are capable of it. To interdict oil would seem
reasonable, but you have got to have an. "all-out" effort to do that.
At the present time the 70 Air Group Plan doesn't. make
sense
whatever without so many more thousand transport
any
planes in it than we seem to be thinking about. They would just
be floundering if you were just going to use them as tactical air-
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craft even for strategic bombing, if you were going to depend on
that. Just think of the logistics of it, and suppose you got half of
what you've got in The Berlin Airlift knocked out tomorrow!
Where would your air support be then? I'm talking about C-54's
and C�47's, the flying box-cars, and the work horses that you must
have to move people around under modern conditions. The bal
ap.cing of an air force has not been thought out or acted on. We
really have lost everything if we can't move cargoes by sea, but
there may come a time when we will want to move some stuff fast
by air, and a lot of it. We need to have the cargo planes for that,
no question about that, but the great work horse of the fleet and
the merchant marine is the thing that keeps any kind of war going,
and its bound to continue to do so.
I have kept stressing, "What kind of War?" Are we go
ing to repeat the errors that every people make in history? I
don't think it's limited to democracies. Dr. Berrening, the former
Chan�ellor of Germany, tells me that it was a favorite character
istic of the German General Staff too (which was supposed to be a
pretty good one) of fighting the last war, if not the one before last.
You are lucky if you just fight the last war. I don't mean that
wars change. completely; they don't. The basic characteristics are
always pretty much the same, and no nonsense about that. The
weapons and fire power and so on must be there.

Possibility of an Anti-Schnorkel "Manhattan Project Approach".
But we have two or three propositions that surely are staring
us in the face in any long showdown with Russia. To get on top of the
schnorkel submarine, may be worth a Manhattan Project. Maybe it
ought to be treated that way because there is nothing really more
important to our total defense and our sustaining war potential,
I would think, than this. If you can't deliver troops to those
areas, what good does it do for you to plan an operation? If you
can't support them by supplies, can you depend upon anything?
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Now you may have all the answers to that and I may be
just an alarmist, but I should think the proposition stands pretty
much at top priority. It can be licked if we prepare to go into it,

just as we did the atomic bomb, with a real concentration of ef

fort and money no object. And it had better

cause all these other things

depend

on that.

not

be any object, be

The E. C. A. is not

worth a nickel without that; it's a complete waste.

If we are cut

off from Europe, the E. C. A. is just complete nonsense.

I would think that guided missiles have a part in this far

more important than strategic bombing, if I understand the prob

lem. I used to watch the Air Force put up a lot of planes and

come back, when the jets were operating, with quite a lot of holes
knocked in them.

Now if the Germans had had enough jets and

plenty of gas it would have been awful.

I don't know how many

atomic bombs one would want to trust to long range bombing un
der those conditions.

You may-that is a military proposition. But

guided missiles with atomic warheads, so far, can only be deliv

ered from limited distances. They are still in a highly experimental

stage, as we all know. We had better get that range extended and
the accuracy and the other things increased at all costs.

To be

able to deliver the atomic bomb and to know that it is not going

to be turned on you, is just as important as

having the atomic bomb.

I would think that kind of war is the thing to talk about and

therefore I'm suggesting that the concentration of industrial po

tentials in this area and the kind of raw materials that go into
these things are the most important part of pre-planning a war.

Scientific effort today must be the number one factor in our war

potential.

Industrial pre-planning for changed specifications and sub
stitution can also change greatly the problem of economic poten
tial. Pilot plants, for the experimental increasing of production of
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those things that are absolutely necessary for a new kind of war
and an old kind of war, should be a part of pre-planning. Unless
they are undertaken by government or. through subsidies, com
mercial ventures are not likely to explore them adequately. If we
had had the lime, soda, sinter process worked out, and, in a posi
tion to put in at least a blueprint stage for producing alumina, we
could have used run of the mine Arkansas bauxite very much
sooner. We would have been ready for it at a time when we could
h�ve changed over without knocking the escort vessels out as we
did. We lost so many ships going to the Guianas for bauxite that we
finally had to do it. I think that kind of substitution process
(study and pilot plant phase) is part of the planning of war po
tential now. Pilot plants and changed specifications to domesti
cally available reserves or substitutes may save waste effort in
stockpiling if the plans are far enough advanced to operate
quickly.
Now let me wind up by asking you this question. We are
going to have to supply other people to some degree, and nobody
can estimate the magnitude of that burden. It will depend on time
schedules. Today we would have to supply very few after a limited
time, except with guerrilla weapons. How long could Japan, e. g.
be held today? The Lend-Lease program would have some sig
nificance for Europe. In any case we are certainly going to have
to supply other people to keep them going in some parts of any
war. South America will always be a burden, we can't neglect that
in our calculations. It has to have exports from this country if we
are to get imports in return.
Organizational Problems.

How are we geared up to perform all this organization of
the economy of the United States for its maximum potentialities
today? There ought to be in being, ready to work with, a series
39
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of directives on the. books and ready to put out tomorrow, that
have been very carefully studied. A reserve COI'.PS of _people ,al-.

ready appointed to jobs should be available to staff the necessary
The Army-Navy Munitfons Board has got to . be
agencies.
strengthened· in a way that' it never has been strengthened be
It is essential to professionalize some elements of the

fore.

staff

work

of the

Army and Navy.

I know the difficulty that presents.

I know that a fighting

officer must be a fighting officer and God forbid that we should
take any of the gimp out of any of them.

That quality paid off.

But we must also have people who understand the kind of jobs that
you are going to be called on to· do. to run a very large··. part of
You have been do�ng it now because nobody would

the economy.

do it except somebody in uniform that could be ordered to do it.

People kick about being run by people in uniform, but the plain

fact is that men in uniform are public slaves more than public serv
ants.

They will take low pay and they will take orders to

do work that you can't get anybody else to do. You had four Secre
taries of State until you got a fellow who was used to being
a soldier and who took orders ; and even he is

a

little weary

of it now. So it isn't an invasion of power by the military; it's fall

ing back on them because they are the one group of people in the

country who have been trained through a sense of national duty

not to ask· individualistic questions such as "What do I get out of
it?"

They just try to go on and try to do a job.

Thank God there

. are such people in a democratic society though they take a rough
beating in times of peace.

"In times of peace prepare for war."

You are going to have

to have more expertly trained staff people who spend more time on
a job. I welcome the staff colleges for that reason because ob

viously they are beginning to take this job more seriously all the
way ro�nd. But you must go farther than that. · You really must
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get people who understand these technical and production problems
in:a way that the Ai'my-Navy Munitions Board never understands.
The strategic materials list that we started out the last
war with was something somebody ought to be shot for. It was
because the poor guys barely could get acquainted with the nature
of the ,problem before they were gone. Here today and gone to
morrow! You can't expect them to learn that sort of job in that
way. But somewhere you must have a permanent cadre of people
under your control, as military pe�ple,, who do understand these
problems and who can get in and protect themselves from being
kicked around by "experts" and so-called "industrialists" or
"specialists". I think you had better take that seriously.

Need for More Specialization on Career Staff Work.
With regard to the specialization of staff work, I don't of
fer the German G. H. Q. as a model, but it did have certain real
advantages. The amount of time spent in staff work, compara
tively speaking, by application to it as a career, may have some
thing to be said for it at times like this. The functional devel
opment of our society is one in which, I'm afraid we don't have the
liberty of all being amateurs at everything, and you must know
your stuff in these things in order to deal with the problem
realistically. The training of your people in industry would be an
admirable thing. I know that is being done somewhat, but it
ought to be done more.
Fortunately in this country we can count on patriotism in
war, which does mean that a democracy fights a war pretty well,
I think, on the test.
We didn't do badly last time. We didn't have to deal with
any real fifth column or serious sabotage, which we inevitably will
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in this war. The screening of personnel in war plants today is a
serious business! You know the Russians are planting men and
women throughout our whole system-often carefully cut off from
Red contacts, and we aren't taking that at all seriously enough. We
would have to go into the next show with the certainty that we
were riddled with enemy agents, and we would have to take very
stupid measures, probably wholesale measures of cleaning up
everybody who was thought to be a communist or associated with
them, very unjust measures, because we had failed to take the
adequate measures in time.
Now democracy has to depend on a great many things that
it is very difficult for a democracy to produce, but it does have the
amazing strength that every man is able, in some measure, to con
tinue to press for the thing he believes in, even if he's in a uni
form. He is less free there, we know that. But in the course of
analyzing your problems, if you can set them in some such light
as the one I have been talking about, at least I beg you to take
into consideration some of the measures that have occurred to me
this morning to be real problems for war planning. To solve them
demands a level of devotion and intellige;nce and being above our
selves, all of us in the future to meet the challenge 'that we are
faced with in our world for the leadership of the world. Dare I
use the word "nobility" of spirit? I do. That is what we Americans
must develop and there is no place more fitting for it than in the
Armed Services which are going to have to bear the brunt of it
and which have had that tradition, thank God, throughout our his-·
tory.
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